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Ethnie Politics and Armed Conflict: A 
Configurational Analysis of a New Global 
Data Set 
Andreas Wimmer Lars-Erik Cederman 
UCLA ETH Zurich 
Brian Min 
UCLA 
Quantitative scholarship on civil wars has long debated whether ethnic diversity breeds 
armed conflict. We go beyond this debate and show that highly diverse societies are not 
more conflict prone. Rather, states characterized by certain ethnopolitical configurations 
of power are more likely to experience violent conflict. First, armed rebellions are more 
likely to challenge states that exclude large portions of the population on the basis of 
ethnic background. Second, when a large number of competing elites share power in a 
segmented state, the risk of violent infighting increases. Third, incohesive states with a 
short history of direct rule are more likely to experience secessionist conflicts. We test 
these hypotheses for all independent states since 1945 using the new Ethnic Power 
Relations (EPR) data set. Cross-national analysis demonstrates that ethnic politics is as 
powerful and robust in predicting civil wars as is a country s level of economic 
development. Using multinomial logit regression, we show that rebellion, infighting, and 
secession result from high degrees of exclusion, segmentation, and incohesi?n, 
respectively. More diverse states, on the other hand, are not more likely to suffer from 
violent conflict. 
Karl 
Marx predicted that revolutionary class 
struggles would transform the world dur 
ing the twentieth century. Instead, it turned out 
to be the age of ethnonationalist conflicts. Wars 
fought in the name of national liberation or eth 
nic autonomy comprise only one fifth of the 
Direct correspondence to Andreas Wimmer 
(awimmer@soc.ucla.edu). The authors wish to thank 
the many individuals who helped assemble the data 
set on which this article relies. While we cannot list 
the dozens of country and regional experts who 
generously shared their knowledge, we should like 
to at least mention Dennis Aviles, Yuval Feinstein, 
Dmitry Gorenburg, Wesley Hiers, Lutz Krebs, 
Patrick Kuhn, Anoop Sarbahi, James Scarritt, 
Manuel Vogt, Judith Vorrath, J?rg Weder, and 
Christoph Z?rcher. Luc Girardin implemented the 
software for the online expert survey. The data proj 
ect relied on financial support from UCLA's 
International Institute and the Swiss National 
wars between the Congress of Vienna (1814) 
and the Treaty of Versailles (1919). From 
Versailles to 2001, however, the share of eth 
nonationalist wars rose to 45 percent, and since 
the Cold War ended it has reached 75 percent.1 
Ethnic demands and grievances play a promi 
Science Foundation through the project 
"Democratizing Divided Societies in Bad 
Neighborhoods." For encouraging comments and 
criticisms, we are grateful to Michael Ross as well 
as audiences at the department of sociology of the 
University of Arizona, the Conference on 
Disaggregating the Study of Civil War and 
Transnational Violence held at the University of 
Essex, the Program of Order, Conflict, and Violence 
at Yale, and the Mannheim Center for European 
Social Research. 
1 These figures are based on the data set assembled 
by Wimmer and Min (2006) and concern wars with 
more than 1,000 battle deaths. 
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nent role in most conflicts reported in the daily 
news?from Iraq to Darfur, Kenya to Tibet, 
Israel and Palestine to Burma. What can the 
social sciences offer to an understanding of 
these conflicts? When do lines of conflict fol 
low ethnic divides and what are the causal mech 
anisms linking ethnicity to conflict? 
There is no satisfactory answer to these ques 
tions in the burgeoning quantitative literature on 
civil wars that has emerged over the past decade. 
The most influential school of thought dis 
misses ethnicity as an explanatory factor alto 
gether, arguing that ethnic grievances are too 
widespread to explain the rare event of civil 
war. In this view, rebels fight wherever gov 
ernments are militarily weak or lootable 
resources can feed an insurgent organization 
(the greed-and-opportunity perspective). Other 
scholars maintain that ethnicity does matter, 
and that more ethnically diverse states are more 
likely to see conflict (the diversity-breeds-con 
flict tradition). Yet a third group examines the 
conditions under which discriminated ethnic 
minorities will rebel (the minority-mobiliza 
tion school). We argue that all three traditions 
tend to misconceive the relationship between 
ethnicity and conflict. 
To get this relationship right, we first need to 
recognize that the modern state is not an ethni 
cally neutral actor or a mere arena for political 
competition, but a central object of and partic 
ipant in ethnopolitical power struggles. Why is 
this the case? Our answer takes an institution 
alist point of departure. Contrary to empires, 
nation-states are governed in the name of "their 
peoples," which provides incentives to align 
political loyalties along ethnic divides. To gain 
legitimacy, political elites in control of execu 
tive-level state power will favor co-ethnics when 
deciding with whom to ally and to whom to 
distribute public goods. Politics will then cen 
ter on the question of which ethnic group con 
trols which share of executive government, and 
the struggle over state power will pit ethnical 
ly defined actors against each other. In this 
view, ethnic politics is not exclusively a strug 
gle to rectify the grievances of minority groups, 
as the minority-mobilization school assumes, 
but it is more generally and fundamentally about 
the distribution of state power along ethnic lines. 
The diversity-breeds-conflict school relies on 
demographic indices of heterogeneity that over 
look how ethnicity relates to the state. Rather 
than high degrees of diversity, it is ethnic exclu 
sion from state power and competition over the 
spoils of government that breed ethnic conflict. 
We propose a configurational model that 
identifies three constellations in which this 
struggle over the state is most likely to escalate 
into armed conflict. First, armed rebellions are 
more likely when the state excludes large sec 
tions of the population from central state power 
on the basis of their ethnic background. Second, 
the likelihood of infighting increases when a 
large number of ethnic elites shares govern 
ment power and engages in competitive rival 
ry. Third, both rebellion and infighting will be 
more likely and take on secessionist forms when 
segments of the population have a short and 
troubled history of direct rule by the center. We 
examine these hypotheses with quantitative 
analysis of all states since World War II using 
a new data set on Ethnic Power Relations (EPR). 
This data set records all politically relevant eth 
nic groups, minorities and majorities, and their 
degree of access to executive-level state 
power?from total control of the government to 
overt political discrimination and exclusion. 
The EPR data set overcomes the limitations of 
existing data sets, especially the widely used 
Minorities at Risk data set, which focuses exclu 
sively on disadvantaged minorities and is thus 
unable to capture the dynamics of ethnic poli 
tics at the power center. The EPR data set is also 
an improvement over conventional demographic 
indices of diversity that are only tangentially 
related to the ethnopolitical struggle over the 
state. 
Ethnic politics, our findings reveal, helps to 
explain the dynamics of war and peace, contrary 
to what the greed-and-opportunity school main 
tains. Second, our results demonstrate that more 
diverse states are not more war-prone, in con 
trast to the expectations of the diversity-breeds 
conflict school. Third, disaggregated analysis 
using multinomial logit regressions shows that 
different kinds of ethnic conflicts result from dif 
ferent causal processes: rebellions are more 
likely the higher the share of the excluded pop 
ulation; the chance of infighting increases as the 
number of power sharing elites augments; and 
secessions are more frequent in incohesive states 
that lack a long history of direct rule by the 
center. We thus follow in the footsteps of other 
scholars in the quantitative literature who argue 
that different types of wars have different caus 
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es (Buhaug 2006; Sambanis 2001), and we sup 
port the recent trend of closely investigating 
the various mechanisms that lead to armed con 
flicts (Kalyvas 2007). 
ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT: 
GETTING THE RELATIONSHIP 
RIGHT 
Two major shortcomings characterize the quan 
titative literature on ethnicity and violence. First, 
the mechanisms linking ethnicity to conflict 
are specified in theoretically problematic and 
empirically unsatisfactory ways. Second, quan 
titative approaches tend to overaggregate the 
dependent variable and treat ethnic conflicts as 
though they have uniform causes. We first dis 
cuss the problem of specifying relevant mech 
anisms, focusing on three prominent schools of 
quantitative research on the outbreak of civil 
wars: greed and opportunity, ethnic diversity 
breeds conflict, and minority mobilization. 
The most influential articles argue that eth 
nicity plays no role in predicting the onset of 
civil wars. According to authors in this tradition, 
the increase in ethnic conflicts during the twen 
tieth century does not capture any meaningful 
trend, but is due to the unfortunate tendency of 
both scholarly observers and rebels themselves 
to attribute conflict to primordial ethnic identi 
ties?a collective delusion of sorts (Laitin 
2007:20-27). More important than ethnic iden 
tity or political exclusion along ethnic lines are 
the material and organizational incentives to 
stage a rebellion against government. According 
to Fearon and Laitin's (2003) well-known insur 
gency model, wars erupt when governments 
are weak and rebels have ample opportunities 
to hide from troops while recruiting unemployed 
young men for whatever cause: national liber 
ation, revolutionary progress, the spread of true 
religion, or rich bounty. Similarly, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) maintain that civil wars occur 
where rebellions are most feasible, rather than 
where actors are motivated by ethnic inequali 
ty or social marginalization. More specifically, 
they argue that lootable economic resources 
make organizing and sustaining a rebel organ 
ization easier (see also Collier, Hoeffler, and 
Rohner 2006). 
A second group of scholars insists that eth 
nicity does matter. They suggest various reasons 
why ethnically diverse states experience more 
conflict. Some argue that high degrees of eth 
nic diversity contradict the assumption of cul 
tural homogeneity on which modern 
nation-states are based, thus triggering waves of 
separatist wars and ethnic cleansings (Gellner 
1991; Nairn 1993). Vanhanen (1999), the most 
ardent proponent of the diversity-breeds-conflict 
argument, relies on van den Berghe's sociobi 
ological theory of ethnic nepotism, according to 
which humans tend to favor kin and quasi-kin, 
such as co-ethnics, over others. As a result, 
more ethnically heterogeneous states will have 
more conflict. Finally, Sambanis (2001) draws 
on organizational economy models to argue 
that more ethnically divided societies face high 
er risks of ethnic war because shared ethnicity 
decreases the collective action costs associated 
with organizing a rebel force. Since the likeli 
hood of ethnic rebellion does not depend on 
group size, he expects "the relationship between 
ethnic war and ethnic divisions [to be] linear and 
positive" (Sambanis 2001:266; see also Easterly 
andLevine 1997). 
These two positions?the greed-and-oppor 
tunity school and the diversity-breeds-conflict 
tradition?rely on the same type of demographic 
diversity indicators to test their core assumption 
regarding ethnicity and conflict. Many use a 
linguistic fractionalization index, calculated as 
the likelihood that two randomly drawn indi 
viduals would speak a different language. This 
is a poor indicator for capturing the political 
dynamics associated with ethnic conflict. First, 
not all ethnic groups matter for politics (Chandra 
and Wilkinson 2008; Posner 2004). Second, 
ethnic conflicts are not the outcome of every 
day encounters between individuals; they are the 
result of interactions between the state and eth 
nopolitical movements that challenge state 
authority (Cederman and Girardin 2007). 
Given these conceptual and measurement 
problems, it is not surprising that empirical 
studies produce conflicting results when using 
fractionalization indices. Some find that ethnic 
fractionalization does not explain high-intensi 
ty conflicts (defined as more than 1,000 battle 
deaths per year) (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003). Others show that eth 
nic fractionalization is very important if the 
dependent variable includes low-intensity wars 
(Hegre and Sambanis 2006) or if one focuses on 
ethnic wars (Sambanis 2001) or secessionist 
conflicts only (Buhaug 2006). Some find a par 
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abolie relationship between ethnic fractional 
ization and the prevalence of civil war (Elbadawi 
and Sambanis 2000). Still others maintain that 
polarization between two equally sized ethnic 
groups, rather than fractionalization, best 
explains conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
2005).2 
We move beyond these demographic indica 
tors of ethnic diversity in the analyses that fol 
low by introducing a new data set that records 
politically relevant groups and their access to 
executive state power. This allows for a direct 
test of how ethnic politics affects war and peace, 
rather than relying on demographic proxies far 
removed from how ethnicity works in political 
practice. Once we account for the political 
dynamics of ethnic exclusion and competition, 
diversity in and of itself has no effect on the like 
lihood of civil conflict. 
The third major approach is the minority 
mobilization school. These scholars analyze the 
relationship between ethnicity and conflict at the 
group level, rather than the state level. Coming 
from a political mobilization perspective, Gurr 
(1993a) and others explore the conditions under 
which ethnic minorities protest or rebel. They 
find various factors that account for the politi 
cal behavior of ethnic groups, including, as will 
be familiar to students of social movements, 
the strength of communal grievances and the 
political opportunity structure provided by dif 
ferent political regimes. Gurr and colleagues 
have also assembled a large, worldwide data 
set on these "Minorities at Risk" (MAR). The 
MAR data set has produced a quantum leap in 
the study of ethnic politics and has provided an 
invaluable service to researchers in political 
science (Elkins and Sides 2007; Saideman and 
Ayres 2000; Toft 2003; Walter 2006) and soci 
ology (Chai 2005; Olzak 2006). 
The minority-mobilization perspective comes 
much closer than the other schools to the empir 
ically observable mechanisms linking ethnici 
ty to conflict. We thus incorporate some of their 
insights into the model of ethnic politics devel 
oped below. Their perspective, however, is lim 
ited by its focus on minority groups only. This 
has two consequences. First, the state appears 
2 
Ellingsen (2000) finds support for both a linear 
relationship to fractionalization and a U-shaped rela 
tionship to polarization. 
as ethnically neutral, making it impossible to 
grasp the dynamics of ethnic politics in the 
power center. Second, the MAR coding scheme 
does not fit countries with ruling minorities or 
complex coalitions of ethnically defined elites 
(e.g., Nigeria, India, and Chad).3 In such coun 
tries, ethnic conflict will be pursued in the name 
of excluded majorities (rather than minorities) 
or ethnic groups that share power (and are thus 
not at risk). Roughly half the observations in our 
data set conform to such ethnopolitical con 
stellations and thus escape the logic of the MAR 
approach. By reducing its focus to the political 
mobilization of discriminated minorities, the 
minority-mobilization model overspecifies the 
conditions under which ethnicity leads to con 
flict. 
All major schools in the quantitative litera 
ture fail to specify convincing mechanisms link 
ing ethnicity and conflict. They either rely on a 
version of the ethnic diversity argument that is 
unrelated to the logic of ethnic politics, or they 
define ethnic conflicts too narrowly as a mat 
ter of minority mobilization. A second problem 
in the existing literature is that it conceives eth 
nic conflict as a unitary phenomenon caused by 
uniform factors.4 Qualitative comparative work 
shows the importance of taking different eth 
nopolitical constellations into account and of 
acknowledging the causal heterogeneity of the 
processes that lead to ethnic conflict. The fol 
lowing four vignettes of well-known ethnic con 
flicts illustrate this point. 
In Ireland, when segments of the educated 
Catholic middle class, inspired by the U.S. civil 
rights movement, mobilized against their long 
standing exclusion from power, the state appa 
3 The MAR data set tries to address these limita 
tions by including five "advantaged" minorities who 
benefit from political discrimination and control a 
state apparatus. MAR also includes a series of "com 
munal contenders" (i.e., groups that share power 
with others while at the same time mobilizing in 
protest or rebellion); these are mostly in Africa (Gurr 
1993b). Ethnically defined elites that do not mobi 
lize their constituencies in protest are omitted. 
4 The MAR data set comes closest to a more dis 
aggregated perspective by coding different types of 
ethnic groups. Gurr's (1993b) analysis, however, 
mostly focuses on the difference between peaceful 
protest and violent rebellion, irrespective of these 
group differences. 
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ratus, controlled entirely by Protestants elites 
who ruled Northern Ireland as an outpost of 
the British state, reacted with repression and 
intimidation. The ensuing escalation reinvigo 
rated the Irish nationalist underground army, 
which fought to unite Northern Ireland with 
the rest of the country. This in turn led to the 
emergence of Protestant militias and terrorist 
groups opposed to the nationalist project 
(Bardon2001). 
In Bosnia shortly before independence, the 
leadership of the Serbian territories withdrew 
from the provincial government they had shared 
with Croatian and Bosniak politicians. 
Mobilization for war proceeded quickly on both 
sides. Serbian militias, supported by the army 
of neighboring Yugoslavia, soon attacked 
Croatian and Bosniak villages that they intend 
ed to incorporate into the territory of a future 
Serbian state (Burg and Shoup 1999). 
In January 1994, the now iconic comman 
dante Marcos led a group of masked men and 
women to the main square of San Cristobal de 
la Casas and announced that the indigenous 
peoples of Chiapas and Mexico would no longer 
accept their fate as second-class citizens. He 
demanded profound constitutional, economic, 
and political change. Decades of political mobi 
lization preceded his rebellion, including left 
wing organizations fighting for land reform 
and members of the lower clergy inspired by lib 
eration theology. The central government react 
ed to this provocation by sending the army to 
occupy indigenous villages that supposedly har 
bored members of the Zapatista army. After a 
series of armed encounters, the Zapatistas even 
tually withdrew into the Lacandon jungle 
(Collier and Lowery Quaratiello 1994; Wimmer 
1995). 
Most recently, in Iraq after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein, former Baathist officers and high level 
functionaries joined Sunni clerics, tribal lead 
ers from the Sunni triangle, and forugnjihadists 
in a fragile alliance to fight the new power hold 
ers from the Shiite south of the country. They 
struggled against what they perceived as an ille 
gitimate government controlled by Shiite apos 
tates and Kurdish separatists. Opposing any 
federalization and power sharing on the nation 
al level, they dreamt of restoring the ethnocrat 
ic regime they once controlled. Meanwhile, 
factions within the Shiite block jockeyed for 
power, exploiting the unpopularity of the new 
government and its dependence on U.S. military 
power. The Sadr Army harnessed the support of 
marginalized urban youth to oppose power shar 
ing with Sunni and Kurdish political parties, 
advocating instead a strong, central state under 
Shiite command (Bengio 2004; Cole 2003; 
Wimmer 2003). 
The factors affecting these four conflicts and 
the mechanisms at play are quite different. 
While Irish Catholics and indigenous 
Chiapanecos represent excluded groups that 
mobilized against the state, representatives of 
Bosnian Serbs and Shiite Arabs were partners 
in coalitional governments. Serbian Bosniak 
elites and Iraqi ethnoreligious factions faced a 
disorganized and ethnically fragmented state, 
while Catholics in Northern Ireland and the 
Zapatistas in Mexico opposed an entrenched 
state apparatus. The IRA and the Bosnian Serb 
nationalists developed separatist agendas aimed 
at joining established neighboring states, while 
the Zapatistas and Iraqi groups focused on 
changing ethnic power relations within existing 
states. It seems doubtful that any single indica 
tor can accurately grasp these different eth 
nopolitical dynamics. The power configurations 
are different, as are the mechanisms and logic 
relating ethnicity to conflict. In the following 
discussion, we introduce a configurational 
approach that links different ethnopolitical con 
stellations with distinct causal pathways lead 
ing to specific types of ethnic conflict. 
AN INSTITUTIONALISE 
CONFIGURATIONAL THEORY OF 
ETHNIC POLITICS AND CONFLICT 
Our theory of ethnic politics and conflict is 
based on two pillars. First, we rely on institu 
tionalist theories that show how established 
structures of political legitimacy provide incen 
tives for actors to pursue certain types of polit 
ical strategies. Second, our model follows a 
configurational logic. Depending on the con 
figuration of political power, similar political 
institutions can produce different consequences, 
while similar consequences can result from dif 
ferent constellations of power. The institution 
alist part of the argument specifies the 
conditions under which political loyalties will 
align along ethnic cleavages; the configura 
tional part explains when we expect such eth 
nic politics to lead to armed violence. 
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institutional incentives for ethnic 
Politics 
We derive the institutionalist part of the argu 
ment from Wimmer's (2002) theory of nation 
state formation and ethnic politics. It states that 
ethnicity matters for politics, not because of a 
universal, naturally-given tendency to favor 
(ethnic) kin over non-kin (as sociobiologists 
argue), nor because of a primordial attachment 
of individuals to their identities, nor because it 
provides lower costs for political organization 
(as the political economy tradition maintains). 
Rather, ethnicity matters because the nation 
state itself relies on ethnonational principles of 
political legitimacy: the state is ruled in the 
name of an ethnically defined people and rulers 
should therefore care for "their own people." As 
a result, ethnicity and nationhood have much 
greater political significance in nation-states 
than they do in other types of polities such as 
empires or city-states. 
Given this institutional environment, politi 
cal off ice holders have incentives to gain legit 
imacy by favoring co-ethnics or co-nationals 
over others when distributing public goods and 
government jobs; judiciary bodies have incen 
tives to apply the principle of equality before the 
law more for co-ethnics or co-nationals than 
for others; the police have incentives to provide 
protection for co-ethnics or co-nationals, but less 
for others; and so forth. The expectation of eth 
nic preference and discrimination works the 
other way too. Voters prefer parties led by co 
ethnics or co-nationals, delinquents hope for 
co-ethnic or co-national judges, and citizens 
prefer to be policed by co-ethnics or co-nation 
als. 
Not all modern nation-states are characterized 
by such ethnic and national favoritism, howev 
er. As we discuss elsewhere, this favoritism is 
more likely in poor states that lack the resources 
for universal inclusion, as well as in states with 
weak civil society institutions where other, 
nonethnic channels for aggregating political 
interests and rewarding political loyalty are 
scarce (Wimmer 2002). In such states, political 
leaders and followers orient their strategies 
toward avoiding dominance by ethnic or nation 
al others?they strive for the self-determina 
tion and self-rule that are at the core of 
nationalist ideology. This motive is at the same 
time material, political, and symbolic: "ade 
quate" or "just" representation in a central gov 
ernment offers material advantages, such as 
access to government jobs and services; legal 
advantages such as the benefits of full citizen 
ship rights, a fair trial, and protection from arbi 
trary violence; and symbolic advantages such as 
the prestige of belonging to a "state-owning" 
ethnic or national group. The aggregate conse 
quence of these strategic orientations is a strug 
gle over control of the state between ethnically 
defined actors?or ethnic politics for short 
(Esman 1994; Rothschild 1981). 
Such ethnic politics may lead to a process of 
political mobilization, counter-mobilization, 
and escalation. Political leaders appeal to the 
ideal of self-rule and fair representation 
enshrined in the nation-state model to mobilize 
their followers against the threat of ethnic dom 
inance by others. These demands may stir the 
fear of ethnic dominance among other political 
elites and their ethnic constituencies and result 
in a process of counter-mobilization. The con 
flicting demands may finally spiral into armed 
confrontation. Our theory does not explicitly 
address the logic of this escalation process (see 
Olzak 2006; Tarrow and Tilly 2006) but seeks 
to specify the ethnopolitical configurations that 
make it more likely. 
Ethnopolitical Configurations of 
Power and Types of Ethnic Conflict 
To accomplish this task, we first introduce some 
conceptual tools to describe different configu 
rations of actors and the power relations between 
them (see Figure 1). Borrowing from Tilly's 
(1978) polity model, we distinguish between 
various social groups that control or have access 
to the central government (the inner circle in 
grey), those who are excluded from govern 
ment but are still citizens of the country (the next 
circle in white), and finally, the social world 
beyond the territorial boundaries of the state. 
Each ethnopolitical constellation of power is 
thus defined by three types of boundaries: (1) 
the territorial boundaries of a state that define 
which ethnic communities are considered a 
legitimate part of a state's citizenry, (2) the 
boundary of inclusion separating those who 
share government power from those who are not 
represented at the highest levels of government, 
and (3) the division of power and the number of 
ethnic cleavages among the included sections of 
the population. 
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Secession J Rebellion 
Figure 1. Ethnopolitical Constellations of Power and Conflict 
Each boundary can become the focus of eth 
nopolitical conflict: who is included or exclud 
ed from state power, how power is shared among 
ethnic elites and their constituencies, and which 
ethnic communities should be governed by a 
state. We can thus distinguish between three 
types of ethnic conflict, depending on which of 
these boundaries is at stake and which actors are 
challenging each other over its location. When 
excluded segments of a population fight to shift 
the boundaries of inclusion, we call these con 
flicts rebellions. When ethnic elites in power are 
pitted against each other in a struggle over the 
spoils of government, we speak of infighting. 
Secession aims at changing the territorial bound 
aries of a polity and can be pursued by both 
excluded and included groups. 
War-Prone Configurations: 
Hypotheses 
Following the logic of our configurational argu 
ment, we propose separate hypotheses for rebel 
lions, infighting, and secession. First, a high 
degree of ethnic exclusion will increase the like 
lihood of rebellion (Hypothesis 1) because it 
decreases a state's political legitimacy. This 
makes it easier for political leaders to mobilize 
a following among their ethnic constituencies 
and challenge the government.5 We expect that 
the most war-prone configurations are ethnoc 
racies, that is, the rule of an elite with a small 
ethnic constituency (e.g., the Tutsi in Burundi, 
white settlers in Rhodesia, and Sunni rule under 
Saddam Hussein). 
Second, we assume that infighting is more 
likely to occur when many partners share gov 
ernment power, that is, in states characterized 
by a segmented center. The greater the number 
of political partners, the more likely alliances 
will shift, increasing the fear of losing out in the 
5 For additional specifications of the mechanisms 
leading to successful ethnic mobilization, see Hechter 
and Levi (1979), Gurr (1993b), and Wimmer (1997). 
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ongoing struggle over the distribution of gov 
ernment spoils.6 In such configurations, an elite 
faction is more likely to mobilize its ethnic fol 
lowers and challenge its power sharing part 
ners by demanding a bigger share of the 
government cake. In states with only one eth 
nically defined elite in power, such ethnic 
infighting is logically impossible. Thus, the 
greater the number of power sharing elites, the 
greater the likelihood of violent infighting 
(Hypothesis 2). We expect countries character 
ized by a high degree of center segmentation, 
such as Lebanon and India, to be particularly 
conflict-prone. 
Third, we hypothesize that states with a long 
history of indirect rule are more likely to see 
secessionist conflicts (Hypothesis 3). In such 
states, large segments of the population are not 
accustomed to being governed directly by the 
political center. These groups can be more eas 
ily mobilized for a secessionist project with the 
argument that only independence will avoid the 
danger or reality of alien rule (Hechter 2003). 
An example is Bosnia, which spent the nine 
teenth and most of the twentieth century under 
Ottoman, Habsburg, and later Yugoslavian rule. 
Fourth, we postulate that secession is more like 
ly in large states (Hypothesis 4). Large states are 
less likely to have penetrated the outer reaches 
of their territory in the past, and thus the pop 
ulation is less accustomed to direct rule. 
Imperial past and population size are both meas 
urements of state cohesion, that is, the degree 
to which the population takes a state's territo 
rial borders for granted and identifies with a 
state independent of who controls its govern 
ment. An earlier literature in political anthro 
pology refers to this aspect of an ethnopolitical 
configuration as "institutional pluralism."7 
6 Horowitz (1985) offers many insights into the 
mechanisms through which such elite competition 
escalates into violent conflict, including mutual out 
bidding of ethnic parties, the holding of a close elec 
tion that resembles an ethnic census (see also 
Wilkinson 2004), and the logic of military coups 
and counter-coups. 
7 
Existing typologies are also based on exclusion, 
elite segmentation, and state cohesion as main aspects 
of ethnopolitical configurations of power. Hechter and 
Levi (1979), Horowitz (1985), Lustick (1979), and 
Wimmer (2002) distinguish highly exclusionary 
states and those with high levels of elite segmenta 
Secessionist groups claiming to represent power 
sharing partners or excluded populations are 
more likely to challenge states that lack coher 
ence. Low state cohesion thus reinforces the 
dynamics of exclusion and segmentation and 
leads challengers to secessionist paths. 
Additional factors may halt the spiral of 
mobilization, counter-mobilization, contesta 
tion, and escalation and instead lead to a path 
of accommodation and de-escalation. First, rich 
states' governments can better accommodate 
protest movements through redistribution poli 
cies and by co-opting the movements' leadership 
into the power elite, such as in the aftermath of 
the civil rights movement in the United States. 
The same holds true for dissatisfied members 
of a power sharing arrangement: new govern 
ment institutions can be created and staffed 
with their followers, and new infrastructure 
projects can be directed toward their ethnic con 
stituency. Both rebellions and infighting, there 
fore, should be less likely the greater a state s 
level of development (Hypothesis 5). Our model 
incorporates one of the most robust findings in 
the civil war literature (Hegre and Sambanis 
2006)?that civil wars happen in poor coun 
tries?and gives it a new interpretation in line 
with theories of contestation and violence (see 
Tarrow and Tilly 2006:145). 
Second, the likelihood that a particular actor 
will instigate conflict depends on the entire 
power configuration, not just on that actor's 
position within that configuration. More specif 
ically, we expect that power sharing partners 
are less likely to fight each other when there is 
a high risk of rebellion by the excluded popu 
lation. We assume that the likelihood of infight 
ing decreases as the degree of exclusion 
increases (Hypothesis 6) and as states become 
larger (and thus more incoherent) (Hypothesis 
7). Our configurational theory posits that exclu 
sion and cohesion will have opposite effects on 
different types of ethnic conflict. Ethnocracies 
tion. Anthropologists working in "complex societies" 
have analyzed different degrees of institutional plu 
ralism (Despres 1968; Simpson 1995; Smith 1969), 
referring to the cohesion dimension. Cohen (1978) 
combines cohesion and exclusion, while 
Schermerhorn (1970) combines segmentation and 
exclusion. Young (1976) and Rothschild (1981) offer 
the most comprehensive typologies building on all 
three aspects. 
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will have more rebellions (Hypothesis 1) but less 
infighting among the included population 
(Hypothesis 6); incoherent states will have more 
secessions (Hypothesis 4) but less infighting 
(Hypothesis 7). Only a disaggregated research 
design distinguishing between different types of 
ethnic conflicts can test these hypotheses. 
Relation to Existing Theoretical 
Traditions and Empirical Findings 
Our configurational theory incorporates and 
reconciles two sets of theoretical propositions 
that are usually seen as mutually exclusive. 
First, much debate centers on whether exclusion 
and segregation (the "internal colonialism" 
model of Hechter [1975]) or competition and 
increased contact (Horowitz 1985; Olzak and 
Nagel 1986) are more conflict-prone. Our the 
ory maintains that both hierarchical exclusion 
and vertical competition are relevant mecha 
nisms that link ethnic politics to violence, but 
they affect different types of actors, as defined 
by actors' positions in the ethnopolitical power 
configuration. Our theory also specifies what 
competition and exclusion are about: they are 
not primarily about individual goods such as 
housing or jobs (as maintained by competition 
theory), nor more generally the fruits of mod 
ernization (as argued in Horowitz 1985). Rather, 
competition and exclusion concern control over 
the state and the public goods and services at its 
disposal. 
Our approach also avoids the popular dis 
tinction between "greed" and "grievance" the 
ories of civil war (introduced by Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004). While the alliteration is cer 
tainly seductive, and the dichotomy resonates 
well with Western traditions of opposing the 
material to the ideal, it makes little empirical 
sense. As argued above, ethnic politics simul 
taneously concerns material interests, such as 
access to government controlled jobs, services, 
and contracts; idealist motives, such as the 
recognition of one's ethnic heritage by the state; 
and genuine political goals, such as access to 
state power. Because political domination by 
ethnic others also affects one's economic, legal, 
and symbolic standing, it is pointless to try to 
disentangle these intertwined and mutually rein 
forcing motives (see Tarrow and Tilly 2006). The 
crucial question is not whether rebels are cool 
ly calculating materialists or hot-blooded ide 
alists fighting for a cause, but rather what causal 
dynamics lead actors with complexly inter 
twined motives down the path toward conflict. 
Our institutionalist theory of ethnic config 
urations and conflict builds on previous empir 
ical research while extending it in new 
directions. To date, no scholar has proposed or 
tested hypotheses regarding center segmenta 
tion?that is, how the number of power sharing 
elites influences infighting. In line with our 
hypothesis that low state cohesion is related to 
secession, quantitative research based on the 
MAR data set (Gurr 1993b; Walter 2006) shows 
that previous political autonomy predicts the 
likelihood of secession at the group level. 
Similarly, on the basis of a new data set, Roeder 
(2007) demonstrates that previous provincial 
autonomy greatly increases the likelihood of 
nationalist mobilization.8 Buhaug (2006) shows 
that population size affects secessionist con 
flicts only, but he offers a different explanation 
for this finding. 
Quantitative tests of the exclusion hypothe 
sis (Hypothesis 1) produce more conflicting 
results. Gurr (1993b: 179) uses his Minorities at 
Risk data to demonstrate that political disad 
vantage increases the likelihood of armed rebel 
lion, while political discrimination decreases 
it. Using data covering all countries from 1945 
to 2001, Fearon and Laitin (2003:85) find that 
a lack of minority language rights and a con 
stitutional preference for certain religious 
groups do not increase the likelihood of high 
intensity civil war. Wimmer and Min (2006) 
also use a global data set and aggregate coun 
try-level MAR data; they demonstrate that coun 
tries with more politically discriminated groups 
are more likely to have civil wars. Olzak 
(2006:124) also aggregates MAR data to the 
country level for a subset of 55 countries from 
1965 to 1989. She arrives at the conflicting 
conclusion that both ethnic discrimination and 
the granting of ethnic group rights are associ 
8 Two other factors that we do not incorporate into 
our theory are known to increase the likelihood of 
secession: kin groups across the border (Gurr 1993b; 
Saideman and Ayres 2000; see also Davis and Moore 
1997; but see Walter 2006) and geographic concen 
tration and peripheral location (Buhaug, Cederman, 
and R0d 2008; Saideman and Ayres 2000; Toft 2003; 
Walter 2006). 
This content downloaded from 137.204.1.40 on Tue, 4 Feb 2014 17:15:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ETHNIC POLITICS AND ARMED CONFLICT 325 
ated with higher intensity of ethnic rebellion. 
Cederman and Girardin (2007) made a first 
attempt to code ethnic groups' access to state 
power in the countries of Eurasia and found 
evidence that exclusion breeds conflicts. Some 
have contested this finding (Fearon, Kasara, 
and Laitin 2007),9 but more recently, Buhaug 
and colleagues (2008) confirmed the initial 
results using Eurasian data that include addi 
tional geo-coded variables. 
Existing tests of the exclusion argument are 
thus rather inconclusive.10 We argue that this is 
because of measurement problems and data 
limitations. Most researchers define exclusion 
narrowly, focusing on a small number of minor 
ity rights rather than explicitly measuring access 
to state power. The corresponding data thus do 
not capture ethnic power relations in a broader, 
nonlegalistic way and depend too much on the 
dominant majority versus discriminated minor 
ity scheme of the MAR data set. Data sets that 
use a broader definition of exclusion are limit 
ed in geographic scope and purely cross-sec 
tional and therefore do not record changes in 
ethnic power relations over time. There is thus 
ample room to improve on the existing research 
to test the exclusion argument in a more ade 
quate and comprehensive way. This is the aim 
of the new data set we have assembled. 
THE ETHNIC POWER RELATIONS 
(EPR) DATA SET, 1946 TO 2005 
The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set 
identifies all politically relevant ethnic cate 
gories around the world and measures access to 
executive-level state power for members of these 
ethnic categories in all years from 1946 to 2005. 
For the sake of brevity, we introduce only the 
major aspects of the data set here and refer 
9 Fearon and colleagues (2007) propose an alter 
native measurement strategy that records the ethnic 
background of each country's head of state. This 
does not capture broader, institutionalized structures 
of inequality, however, and necessitates ad hoc 
changes in the data to avoid misleading codings (e.g., 
Georgian dominance of the Soviet Union under Stalin 
or Qu?b?cois hegemony in Canada under Trudeau). 
10 Others have tested an exclusion argument for 
secessionist minority rebellion only, using the MAR 
data set, and arrived at contradicting results as well 
(Saideman and Ayres 2000; Walter 2006). 
readers to the Online Supplement on the ASR 
Web site (http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/ 
2009/toc068.html) for more details about cod 
ing procedures and rules. The data set contains 
two parts. The first is a country-year data set that 
codes all politically relevant ethnic groups and 
their degree of access to central state power.11 
The second is a conflict data set, based on the 
widely used PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict 
Data Set that includes all armed conflicts with 
more than 25 battle deaths. We extend the data 
set with new codings of whether rebels pur 
sued ethnic or nonethnic goals, as well as 
whether they aimed at secession. We then link 
conflicts to politically relevant ethnic groups if 
rebels claimed to fight in the name of a partic 
ular ethnic community. 
Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups 
and Access to Power 
Following the constructivist, Weberian tradi 
tion, we define ethnicity as a subjectively expe 
rienced sense of commonality based on a belief 
in common ancestry and shared culture. This 
definition includes ethnolinguistic, ethnoso 
matic (or "racial"), and ethnoreligious groups, 
but not tribes and clans that conceive of ances 
try in genealogical terms, nor regions that do not 
define commonality on the basis of shared 
ancestry. Ethnic categories may be hierarchically 
nested and comprise several levels of differen 
tiation, not all of which are politically relevant 
at a particular time. (On the notion of ethnici 
ty underlying this project, see Wirnmer 2008.) 
An ethnic category is politically relevant if at 
least one significant political actor claims to rep 
resent the interests ofthat group in the nation 
al political arena, or if members of an ethnic 
category are systematically and intentionally 
discriminated against in the domain of public 
politics. We do not distinguish between degrees 
of representativity of political actors who claim 
to speak for an ethnic group, nor do we code the 
heterogeneity of political positions voiced by 
leaders claiming to represent the same com 
munity (Brubaker 2004). The coding scheme 
allows us to identify countries or specific peri 
11 The data set includes all 155 sovereign states 
with a population of at least 1 million and a surface 
area of at least 500,000 square kilometers as of 2005. 
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ods in which political objectives, alliances, or 
disputes were never framed in ethnic terms, 
thus avoiding using an ethnic lens for countries 
not characterized by ethnic politics, such as 
Tanzania and Korea. 
Because politically relevant categories and 
access to political power may change over time, 
coders divided the 1946 to 2005 period and 
provided separate codings for each subperiod. 
This was also necessary when the list of polit 
ically relevant categories changed from one 
year to the next (either because certain cate 
gories ceased to be or became relevant for the 
first time, or because higher or lower levels of 
ethnic differentiation became salient). Next, we 
coded the degree of access to power enjoyed by 
political leaders who claimed to represent var 
ious groups. 
We focus only on executive-level power, that 
is, representation in the presidency, cabinet, and 
senior posts in the administration, including the 
army. The weight given to these institutions 
depends on their de facto power in a given coun 
try. In all cases, coders focused on absolute 
access to power irrespective of the question of 
under- or overrepresentation relative to the 
demographic size of an ethnic category. 
We categorized all politically relevant ethnic 
groups according to the degree of access to 
central state power by those who claimed to 
represent them. Some held full control of the 
executive branch with no meaningful partici 
pation by members of any other group, some 
shared power with members of other groups, and 
some were excluded altogether from decision 
making authority. Within each of these three 
categories, coders differentiated between further 
subtypes, choosing from monopoly power, dom 
inance, senior or junior partner in a power shar 
ing arrangement, regional autonomy, powerless, 
and discriminated (see the ASR Online 
Supplement for details of the coding scheme). 
For the present analysis, we distinguish only 
between power-holding groups (whatever their 
share of power) and the excluded population (for 
a disaggregated analysis on the group level, 
using the full array of power categories, see 
Cederman, Wimmer, and Min [2009]). 
War Coding 
The conflict data set created for this project is 
based on the widely used Uppsala/PRIO Armed 
Conflicts Data Set (ACD) (Gleditsch et al. 
2002). ACD defines armed conflict as any 
armed and organized confrontation between 
government troops and rebel organizations, or 
between army factions, that reaches an annual 
battle-death threshold of 25 people. Massacres 
and genocides are not included because the vic 
tims are neither organized nor armed; commu 
nal riots and pogroms are excluded because the 
government is not directly involved. 
To date, the ACD has been of limited use for 
ethnic conflict analysis because it does not con 
tain information on whether a conflict should be 
classified as ethnic. To overcome this limitation, 
we conducted new research and coded each 
conflict for whether rebel organizations pur 
sued ethnonationalist aims and recruited along 
ethnic lines. We also coded whether rebels 
aimed at establishing a new independent state. 
We distinguish between ethnic and nonethnic 
conflicts using the aims of the armed organi 
zation and their recruitment and alliance struc 
tures (this is in line with other ongoing coding 
projects, e.g., Sambanis 2009). We identify as 
"ethnic" the aims of achieving ethnonational 
self-determination, a more favorable ethnic bal 
ance-of-power in government, ethnoregional 
autonomy, the end of ethnic and racial dis 
crimination, language and other cultural rights, 
and so forth. In ethnic wars, armed organizations 
also recruit fighters predominantly among their 
leaders' ethnic group and forge alliances on the 
basis of ethnic similarity. 
We looked at the aims and recruitment pat 
terns of each armed organization involved in a 
conflict separately. In some complex cases (e.g., 
Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Uganda, Angola, 
and Zaire), we disaggregated a conflict into 
subconflicts when the nongovernmental side 
made different ethnic claims and rebel organi 
zations acted independent from each other. Our 
data set thus contains a higher number of con 
flicts than the original ACD data (see the ASR 
Online Supplement for details). 
We then linked all ethnic conflicts to the 
politically relevant ethnic category in the EPR 
data set. To avoid endogeneity problems, we 
made sure that the coding of ethnic power rela 
tions reflects the power constellation before the 
outbreak of conflict in cases where political 
changes occurred in the same year as a conflict. 
To test our configurational theory of ethnic 
conflict, we then divided ethnic conflicts into 
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Table 1. The Conflict Data Set 
Ethnic Conflicts 
Infighting Rebellions Nonethnic Conflicts Total 
Secessionist 9 48 3 60 
Nonsecessionist 11 42 102 155 
Total Infighting/Rebellions 20 90 
Total 110 105 215 
those fought in the name of ethnic groups 
excluded from central government power (rebel 
lions) and those fought in the name of power 
holders (infighting). We further subdivided 
rebellions and infighting depending on whether 
they aimed to establish a separate, independent 
state or join another existing state. This produced 
a fourfold typology with separatist rebellions, 
nonseparatist rebellions, separatist infightings, 
and nonseparatist infightings 
Our data set includes 215 armed conflicts 
fought between 1946 and 2005, 110 of which 
were ethnic conflicts. Of the 215 conflicts, 60 
had secessionist aims, the vast majority of which 
were also ethnic in character. Among the 110 
ethnic conflicts, 20 were fought by groups in 
power and 90 by excluded groups (see Table 1). 
One half of the conflicts reached the standard 
threshold of civil war (more than 1,000 battle 
deaths in a year). 
VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
Exclusion, Center Segmentation, 
State Cohesion 
To test Hypothesis 1, we compute the share of 
the excluded population in the total population 
that is ethnopolitically relevant. We call this the 
share of the excluded population for short. We 
assume that increases in the share of the exclud 
ed population have a greater effect on the like 
lihood of conflict at lower levels of exclusion 
than at higher levels, and we therefore use a 
logged transformation of this variable.12 We 
measure the degree of center segmentation 
12 We hypothesize that the initial break with the eth 
nonational principles of legitimacy of modem nation 
states carries more political risk than does the shift 
to an even more exclusionary ethnocracy. 
(which according to Hypothesis 2 is associated 
with higher conflict probability) by counting the 
number of power sharing groups represented by 
ethnic elites. The number of power sharing part 
ners ranges from 1 to 14 (in India). Following 
Hypothesis 3, the cohesion of a state decreas 
es the longer the pre-independence history of 
indirect rule in an empire and the larger the 
size of the population. We rely on a measure of 
a state's past imperial history that calculates 
the percentage of years spent under imperial 
rule between 1816 and independence (Wimmer 
and Min 2006). We count as imperial rule all 
years during which a territory was a colonial or 
imperial dependency (including of the Soviet 
Union and other communist empires) or the 
heartland of a landbased empire (e.g., Turkey 
under the Ottomans or Austria under the 
Habsburgs, but not the "mother country" of an 
empire with seaborne colonies, like Portugal). 
Other Variarles 
We control for other robustly significant vari 
ables in civil war research, especially those 
identified in Hegre and Sambanis's (2006) meta 
analysis. We include linguistic fractionaliza 
tion (as found in Fearon and Laitin's data set) 
to show its limited significance once ethnic 
politics variables are included. GDP per capi 
ta13 and a state's population size also play impor 
13 Our GDP per capita data are in constant 2000 
US Dollars. Data for 5,737 observations (79 per 
cent) come from Perm World Table 6.2. Using growth 
rates from the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators provided 229 more observations (3 per 
cent). Using Fearon and Laitin's data, we calculated 
annual growth rates and extended our values back to 
1946. Total data coverage is 7,105 observations (99.6 
percent). 
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tant roles in our theory of ethnic politics (accord 
ing to Hypotheses 4 and 5). 
Democratic civil peace theory states that 
democracies are better able than other political 
regimes to solve internal disputes. Autocracies, 
on the other hand, can suppress rebellions by 
using force or threatening mass violence. Civil 
wars should therefore be less likely in strongly 
democratic and strongly autocratic societies 
(Ellingsen 2000; Hegre et al. 2001; Mansfield 
and Snyder 2005; M?ller and Weede 1990).14 
We use Polity IV data and the widely adopted 
cutoffs of +6 and -6 to identify democracies, 
autocracies, and anocracies (states that are nei 
ther democracies nor autocracies). 
Fearon and Laitin's (2003) insurgency model 
maintains that wars break out when govern 
ment forces are weak and when mountainous 
terrain allows rebels to hide and retreat. We 
include measures of mountainous terrain and 
previous regime change (which should weaken 
the government vis-?-vis the rebels) to evaluate 
their main argument. We adopt the mountain 
ous terrain data from their data set; we define 
regime change as any change in the Polity score 
of 3 points or more over the prior three years. 
Ross (2003) developed a theory of how the 
availability of natural resources affects differ 
ent types of conflict. He expects that when 
rebels can obstruct the extraction of natural 
resources, as with oil, the likelihood of seces 
sionist movements increases (see also Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004). Buhaug (2006), on the other 
hand, argues that oil matters in conflicts over an 
existing state because oil resources are usually 
controlled by the central government. This 
increases the incentives to capture a state, rather 
than to secede from it. To measure the impact 
of oil, we generate an oil production per capi 
ta variable based on data from Wimmer and 
Min (2006). 
MODELS AND FINDINGS 
Our data set includes 7,155 country-year obser 
vations covering 155 sovereign states in all 
years after independence from 1946 to 2005. We 
use the standard modeling approach in the lit 
erature on civil war, regressing a range of inde 
14 Sambanis (2001) and Reynal-Querol (2002) 
confirm this hypothesis for ethnic wars only. 
pendent variables on a binary dependent vari 
able coded as 1 in the first year of an armed con 
flict and 0 otherwise. We create a civil conflict 
onset variable that includes both ethnic and 
nonethnic onsets, as well as a more narrow eth 
nic conflict onset variable. For the ethnic con 
flict onset variable, we disaggregate further to 
distinguish between the political status of the 
groups instigating the conflict (excluded or 
power sharers) and the aims of these parties 
(secession or other aims). 
We test our models against two versions of 
these dependent variables, both common in the 
literature. The first version includes all obser 
vations, including those in which another war 
was already ongoing, and adds a dummy con 
trol for such ongoing war. The second version 
drops ongoing war years by coding them as 
missing, thereby omitting additional wars that 
begin while a first conflict is ongoing. This 
coding of the dependent variable results in 
approximately 15 percent fewer observations. In 
this article, we present results using the first ver 
sion (for models based on the second version, 
see the supplement on the first author's home 
page: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/ 
faculty/wimmer/ AppendixEthnicPolitics .pdf). 
The results of the two models are almost iden 
tical. 
We control for possible time trends by includ 
ing the number of peace years since the outbreak 
of a war, as well as a cubic spline function on 
peace years following Beck, Katz, and Tucker 
(1998). We also add a calendar year variable to 
capture possible changes in the geopolitical cli 
mate over time. For the sake of space, we do not 
show the time control variables in the follow 
ing tables (see supplement on first author's 
homepage). As a robustness check, we tested our 
models with regional controls and without time 
controls and found no large differences in our 
main findings (again, see supplement on first 
author's homepage). Throughout, we specify 
robust standard errors clustered by country to 
account for the nonindependence of observa 
tions from the same state. Because armed con 
flict is a rare event, we also ran our models 
using the "rare events" logit estimator and found 
no substantive differences to our main findings 
(see supplement on first author's homepage). 
Our analysis proceeds in four steps, each 
leading to a more fine-grained, disaggregated 
analysis of conflict onset. First, we determine 
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whether ethnic politics matters at all in pre 
dicting the onset of armed civil conflicts. 
Second, we focus only on ethnic conflicts while 
maintaining our global purview and keeping 
all country-years in the analysis. Third, we eval 
uate whether exclusion and segmentation pre 
dict rebellions and infighting, respectively. 
Finally, we disaggregate further to determine 
how state cohesion affects both rebellion and 
infighting and drives them toward secessionist 
goals. 
Explaining Armed Conflict 
We first test whether ethnic politics matters for 
understanding conflict and peace (Hypotheses 
1, 2, and 3). To ensure that our results do not 
depend on our coding of civil conflicts, we also 
run our model on high-intensity wars only, as 
well as against war codings from the well-known 
civil war data sets assembled by Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) and Sambanis (2004). 
Table 2 shows that ethnic politics is an 
important part of the puzzle in explaining 
civil wars. The results challenge greed-and 
opportunity theories of civil war, according to 
which ethnicity is unrelated to conflict. The 
table also demonstrates that once ethnic pol 
itics is measured directly, the ethnic diversi 
ty index loses significance?contrary to what 
the diversity-breeds-conflict school assumes. 
Rather than diversity as such, it is political 
exclusion along ethnic lines that breeds eth 
nic conflict. 
The share of the excluded population, the 
central variable in our configurational model 
of ethnic conflict, is significant for all model 
specifications: when using Fearon and Laitin's 
or Sambanis's coding of dependent variables 
(i.e., excluding low-intensity wars); when drop 
ping all ongoing war years from the sample or 
leaving them in; and with or without addi 
tional control variables. Ethnic exclusion is as 
consistently related to conflict as is GDP per 
capita, one of the most robust explanatory fac 
tors in the study of civil wars (Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006). 
In contrast, the number of power sharing 
partners (Hypothesis 2) does not have a robust 
impact on civil war onset. This is not surpris 
ing, given that only 20 of the 200 conflicts in this 
analysis were initiated by actors representing 
ethnic groups in power. Moreover, high degrees 
of exclusion should have a mitigating effect on 
the likelihood of infighting (Hypothesis 6), so 
we expect to see the effects of center segmen 
tation only when disaggregating the dependent 
variable. The imperial past variable is positive 
but insignificant (Hypothesis 3). We will 
demonstrate further that the lack of state coher 
ence substantially increases the likelihood of 
ethnic secessionist conflicts.15 
How do other theories of civil war fare in our 
test? Regime change and mountainous terrain 
play a key role in the insurgency model but 
receive rather limited support here, although 
the mountainous variable helps explain one cod 
ing of high-intensity civil wars (Model 4) and 
one version of the ACD conflict coding (Model 
2).16 Oil production per capita is associated 
with resource competition theories and receives 
mixed support (Models 2 and 5). Meanwhile, the 
findings for democratic civil-peace theory are 
more robust: anocracy increases the risk of con 
flict in all models except those run on the high 
intensity ACD wars. 
Explaining Ethnic Conflict 
This is the first time that the ethnic exclusion 
argument has been statistically confirmed based 
on a global data set that measures degrees of 
exclusion directly and at the polity level, rather 
than the group level. The robustness of this 
finding is remarkable, given that we regress on 
all civil conflicts in the data set. Our model of 
ethnic politics makes no claims to explain 
nonethnic wars, such as the civil war in Korea 
15 
Among a large number of robustness checks 
(available in the supplement on the first author's 
homepage), we controlled for endogeneity (the pos 
sibility that past conflict determines future conflict) 
by running models that include a variable for the 
number of past conflicts. This did not affect our 
results (see Table 4d in the supplement on the first 
author's homepage). 16 Sambanis (2004) and Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) also find no support for the mountainous 
variable?but it appears in Hegre and Sambanis's 
(2006) list of the "25 most robust variables," as does 
political instability. We also experimented with Fearon 
and Laitin's "new state" variable (results not shown), 
but we found it extremely sensitive to alternative 
codings (e.g., three instead of two years of inde 
pendence). 
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Table 2. Ethnie Politics and ArmedConflict (l gistic regr sion) 
DV: Onset of Conflicts 
Model 
No.: 
DV: Onset of Ethnic Conflict 
8 
2 2 O G o f o 2 ? > < 3 
Conflict 
Dataset: 
ACD High Fearon and
ACD Intensity Laitin 
Sambanis 
ACD High Fearon and
ACD Intensity Laitin 
Ethnic Politi s Variables Excluded population 
Center segmentation 
Imperial 
past Other 
Variables 
Linguistic fractionalization 
GDP per capita Population size 
Mountainous 
terrain Political instability 
Anocracy 
Oil production per capita 
Ongoing war 
Constant 
N Observations N 
Conflict 
Onsets 
.1887** 
(.0513) 
.0862** 
(.0295) 
.2075 
(.2614) 
-.1239** 
(.0271) 
.1556** 
(.0559) 
-.9832** (.3620) 
-16.1544 
(10.2646) 
6,938 
200 
.1291* 
(.0558) 
.0587 
(.0389) 
.4579 
(.2886) 
.6298 (.3227) 
-.1093** 
(.0276) 
.1397** 
(.0532) 
.1241* 
(.0601) 
.3454 (.1764) 
.4292** 
(.1625) 
.0171** 
(.0063) 
-.9678** 
(.3733) 
-14.2810 (10.5160) 6,865 
197 
.2859** 
(.0834) .0562 (.0455) .7285 
(.4441) 
.1244 (.4597) 
-.1902** 
(.0546) 
.0865 (.0636) .1901 
(.1117) 
.4555 
(.2852) 
.4014 
(.2511) 
.0051 
(.0162) 
-1.2732** 
(.4690) 
-9.0225 
(13.5435) 
6,865 
82 
.2564** 
(.0779) 
.0771 
(.0586) 
.7899* 
(.3568) -.0283 (.4274) 
-.1267** 
(.0374) 
.2354** 
(.0672) 
.1581* 
(.0794) 
.2693 
(.2754) 
.7218** 
(.2369) .0056 
(.0165) 
-2.1655** 
(.4277) 
-49.4749** (14.6798) 
6,034 
97 
.2792** 
(.0808) .0177 
(.0491) 
.5932 
(.3307) 
.0261 
(.3989) 
-.1750** 
(.0472) 
.2135** 
(.0616) 
.1320 
(.0765) 
.2655 
(.2412) 
.6478** (.1863) .0176* 
(.0078) 
-1.4045** (. 435) -46.1852** (14.8129) 5,818 121 
.4192** 
(.0862) 
.1554** 
(.0312) 
.6401 
(.4477) 
-.1446** 
(.0415) 
.2171** 
(.0714) .0359 (.6123) 
-37.1296* 
(14.6291) 
6,938 
103 
.3191** 
(.0875) .1120** 
(.037) 
.9301* 
(.4426) 
1.2800** 
(.3997) -.1256** 
(.0448) 
.2102** 
(.0656) 
.1749 
(.0984) 
.1544 (.2726) .4469* 
(.2263) 
.0180* 
(.0091) 
-.0697 
(.6166) 
-32.6393* (15.1798) 6,865 
102 
.5347** 
(.1351) 
.1272* 
(.053) 1.1793 
(.6304) 
.2563 
(.4974) 
-.1921** 
(.0746) 
.1884* 
(.0757) 
.3258* 
(.1483) 
.2979 
(.3958) 
.5681 
(.2929) 
.0277** 
(.0083) 
-.7636 
(.6271) 
-26.7855 (17.9573) 
6,865 50 
.3667** 
(.1214) 
.0969 
(.0747) 1.5761** (.4244) 
.599 
(.6156) 
-.1554** 
(.0585) .3609** (.0894) 
.0701 
(.109) 
-.0441 
(.3549) 
.9738** 
(.2614) 
.0064 
(.0284) 
-2.2861** 
(.5551) 
-80.7809** (17.4279) 
6,034 66 
Note: Time controls not shown; 
robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*/?<.05; 
**/?<.01. 
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or army coups in Brazil. Because half of the con 
flicts in our data set are not fought in the name 
of ethnic groups, a more focused investigation 
needs to exclude nonethnic conflicts, as we do 
in Models 6 to 9 in Table 2. We thus follow 
Sambanis (2001) who shows that, because dif 
ferent factors cause ethnic and nonethnic civil 
wars, they should be analyzed separately (but 
see Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
Once we focus on ethnic conflicts only, the 
other two ethnic politics variables become sta 
tistically significant. The number of power shar 
ing groups is significant in all models except in 
regressions on Fearon and Laitin's coding of 
high-intensity wars. The imperial past variable, 
which measures the degree of state cohesion and 
should predict secessionist conflicts only, reach 
es significance in some models (we revisit this 
result further below). 
Exclusion, segmentation, and incohesi?n are 
also substantively important for the dynamics of 
war and peace. Increasing the share of the 
excluded population from 6 to 32 percent (an 
increase of one standard deviation from the 
mean) results in a 25 percent increase in the 
probability of ethnic conflict (calculated on the 
basis of Model 7). A one standard deviation 
increase in center segmentation leads to a 9 
percent increased risk of conflict, while a sim 
ilar increase in years under imperial rule increas 
es the chance of armed conflict by 13 percent. 
A one standard deviation increase in GDP per 
capita and population size, the two most robust 
variables in the civil war literature, influence the 
probability of war by 22 and 13 percent, respec 
tively.17 
The strength and robustness18 of the exclu 
sion, segmentation, and cohesion variables are 
remarkable because the dependent variable 
here does not distinguish between different 
types of ethnic conflict. Our theory assumes, 
however, that infighting, rebellion, and seces 
sion are caused by different ethnopolitical con 
figurations and that the same variable could 
therefore have opposite effects on the likeli 
hood of different types of conflict (see 
Hypotheses 1, 4, 6, and 7). To test this, we 
17 See the table of first difference, Table S3, in the 
ASR Online Supplement. 
18 For a series of robustness checks, see Tables 5 
in the supplement on the first author's homepage. 
disaggregate the dependent variable further 
and use multinomial logit regressions to pre 
dict the onset of different types of ethnic con 
flicts. 
Explaining Rerellion and Infighting 
We first distinguish between ethnic conflicts 
fought in the name of excluded groups (rebel 
lions) and those begun by power sharing part 
ners (infighting). We expect that the two 
principal aspects of ethnic politics affect rebel 
lions and infighting differently As the number 
of power sharing elites increases and their 
alliances therefore become more unstable, their 
likelihood of fighting wars against each other 
should also increase (Hypothesis 2). Center 
segmentation should have no effect, however, on 
rebellions by leaders who claim to represent 
excluded groups. The size of the excluded pop 
ulation should have opposite effects on includ 
ed and excluded groups: it should increase the 
likelihood of rebellion (Hypothesis 1) and there 
fore provide a disincentive for infighting 
(Hypothesis 6). 
Table 3 shows that the greater the number of 
groups that share power, the greater the like 
lihood that they will fight each other on the bat 
tlefield. Infighting is also influenced, and again 
negatively, by population size (Hypothesis 7). 
The larger (and thus more incoherent) a state's 
population, the less likely elites can afford to 
fight each other to increase their share of 
power. Contrary to our expectations, infight 
ing is not significantly less likely when large 
segments of the population are excluded from 
power nor in richer countries (inconsistent 
with Hypotheses 6 and 5, respectively), 
although the signs of the coefficients point in 
the expected direction. 
The size of the excluded population does 
influence rebellions by excluded groups 
(Hypothesis 1). Rebellions are less likely in 
rich countries (Hypothesis 5) where govern 
ments can afford to redistribute state resources 
or co-opt the leaders of protest movements. 
Hypothesis 5 therefore receives mixed support. 
More populous and linguistically heterogeneous 
states are more likely to see rebellions (a find 
ing that is mostly driven by secessionist wars, 
as we will see in the next section). State coher 
ence (measured through the imperial past vari 
able) does not consistently predict rebellions 
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Table 3. Ethnic Conflicts by Actor Type (multinomial logistic regression) 
Model 1 Model 2 
Type of ethnic conflict: 
Infighting by 
Power Holders 
Rebellion by 
Excluded 
Infighting by 
Power Holders 
Rebellion by 
Excluded 
Ethnic Politics Variables 
Excluded population 
Center segmentation 
Imperial past 
Other Variables 
Linguistic fractionalization 
GDP per capita 
Population size 
Mountainous terrain 
Political instability 
Anocracy 
Oil production per capita 
Ongoing war 
Constant 
N Observations 
N Conflict Onsets 
-.0379 
(.1659) 
.3583** 
(.0568) 
2.8363 
(1.5424) 
-.8215 
(1.1411) 
-.2628 
(.1493) 
-.2531* 
(.1184) 
.5618 
(1.2172) 
-93.2683* 
(37.7776) 
6,935 
20 
.5212** 
(.0808) 
.0468 
(.0387) 
.4000 
(.4405) 
1.5463** 
(.4868) 
-.0921* 
(.0391) 
.3832** 
(.0765) 
-.0881 
(.6913) 
-23.6030 
(15.9535) 
6,935 
83 
-.3146 
(.1802) 
.3285** 
(.0684) 
3.7934* 
(1.8819) 
1.1132 
(1.1328) 
-.2148 
(.1248) 
-.4172** 
(.1517) 
.6026** 
(.2179) 
.1255 
(.6731) 
.4277 
(.4815) 
.0198 
(.0113) 
.2301 
(1.1056) 
-88.1487* 
(42.1082) 
6,865 
19 
.5146** 
(.0848) 
.0648 
(.0433) 
.4520 
(.4836) 
1.4589** 
(.4450) 
-.0967* 
(.0437) 
.3818** 
(.0826) 
.0767 
(.1189) 
.1751 
(.3150) 
.4566 
(.2374) 
.0196 
(.0116) 
-.1307 
(.6827) 
-26.0182 
(16.3912) 
6,865 
83 
Note: Time controls not shown; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*/?<.05; **/?<.01. 
or infighting (a result that we also revisit 
below).19 
Among the control variables introduced in 
Model 2, anocracy is no longer significant. 
Mountainous terrain seems to matter when 
groups in power fight each other, but not in 
countries where rebels try to overthrow the gov 
ernment (as the insurgency model would pre 
dict). Oil resources do not seem to entice either 
included or excluded groups to fight. 
19 
Dropping the time controls, including the vari 
able for the number of past conflicts, or running the 
models with additional region controls produce 
almost no changes to these results (see Tables 6 in the 
supplement on the first author's homepage). 
Explaining Secessionist and 
nonsecessionist conflicts by rebels 
and Infighters 
We now further differentiate between seces 
sionist and nonsecessionist wars. Combining 
actor types with war aims generates four kinds 
of ethnic conflict: secessionist wars fought in the 
name of excluded groups (secessionist rebel 
lions for short), nonsecessionist rebellions, 
secessionist conflict started by power sharing 
groups (secessionist infighting for short), and 
nonsecessionist infighting. We run multinomi 
al logit regressions using these four types of eth 
nic conflict as possible outcomes. 
The results in Table 4 support our expecta 
tions. Exclusion and center segmentation have 
the same effects on the likelihood of rebellions 
and infighting as before, and they also predict 
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Table 4. Ethnic Conflict, by Actor and Aim (multinomial logistic regression) 
War Type: 
Secession by 
Power Holders 
Secession by 
Excluded 
Infighting by 
Power Holders 
Rebellion by 
Excluded 
Ethnic Politics Variables 
Excluded population 
Center segmentation 
Imperial past 
Other Variables 
Linguistic fractionalization 
GDP per capita 
Population size 
Mountainous terrain 
Political instability 
Anocracy 
Oil production per capita 
Ongoing war 
Constant 
N Observations 
N Conflict Onsets 
-.2032 
(.3306) 
.4956** 
(.1164) 
14.6269** 
(2.8503) 
1.4433 
(1.2707) 
-.6017 
(.3302) 
-.1882 
(.1925) 
.6948 
(.3751) 
-35.2497** 
(.6728) 
1.4050 
(.9854) 
-.3692 
(.4031) 
2.6879 
(2.9776) 
-290.3441** 
(41.4419) 
6,865 
9 
.2554* 
(.1109) 
.0008 
(.0417) 
1.9524* 
(.8152) 
1.9997** 
(.6431) 
-.0226 
(.0584) 
.4835** 
(.1256) 
.3943 
(.2211) 
.3655 
(.5128) 
.2931 
(.3892) 
.0016 
(.0452) 
-.1664 
(1.0923) 
-15.6566 
(22.4369) 
6,865 
41 
-.4504 
(.3156) 
.3176** 
(.0960) 
1.1870 
(1.6311) 
.9991 
(1.6116) 
-.1914 
(.1750) 
-.7321** 
(.1841) 
.5656* 
(.2815) 
1.0312 
(.7487) 
.0115 
(.7129) 
.0126 
(.0088) 
-.5972 
(1.7814) 
12.0956 
(68.2112) 
6,865 
10 
.7501** 
(.1277) 
.0689 
(.1001) 
-.8041 
(.7777) 
.9796 
(.8709) 
-.1833* 
(.0814) 
.2498 
(.1329) 
-.0913 
(.1608) 
.0291 
(.4485) 
.6333 
(.3639) 
.0296** 
(.0085) 
-.0502 
(.9068) 
-45.2199 
(23.1803) 
6,865 
42 
Note: Time controls not shown; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*/?<.05; **p<.01. 
the onset of secessionist wars.20 How does state 
cohesion affect conflict? Conforming to 
Hypothesis 3, having spent more years in impe 
rial polities over the past two centuries increas 
es the likelihood of secessionist conflict 
instigated by both power sharers and the lead 
ers of excluded groups. It has no effect, again 
confirming our expectations, on nonsecession 
ist ethnic conflicts. The size of a state's popu 
lation is also linked with secessions (Hypothesis 
4). Both a long imperial past and a large popu 
lation size suggest the presence of population 
20 This result depends on using a logged version 
of the share of the excluded population. A nonlogged 
version, although it does not change any results of 
previous tables, fails to come close to standard sig 
nificance levels in Models 2 and 6 in Table 4 (results 
not shown here). 
segments accustomed to self-rule who are like 
ly to resent the shift to direct rule brought about 
by a modern nation-state. As expected, popula 
tion size is significant and positive for exclud 
ed populations only, and the sign of the 
coefficient is negative for power sharing part 
ners (Hypothesis 7).21 
21 That population size is totally insignificant in 
regressions on the onset of nonethnic wars (results 
not shown) supports our interpretation of popula 
tion size as a proxy for state coherence. This is con 
trary to the interpretation of Fearon and Laitin, who 
hypothesize that large populations are logistically 
and militarily more difficult for governments to con 
trol. Dropping the time controls or running the mod 
els with additional region controls produces some 
small changes to these results (for details, see Tables 
7 in the supplement on the first author's homepage). 
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Our expectations regarding the effects of lev 
els of economic development, however, are 
again not fully confirmed. Richer states' gov 
ernments are able to avoid nonsecessionist rebel 
lions because they can afford to co-opt the 
leadership of ethnic protest movements, but 
they do not experience less nonsecessionist 
infighting. That said, the frequency of violent 
infighting is rare (9 for secessionist and 10 for 
nonsecessionist cases). These results should 
therefore be interpreted with some caution. 
Table 4 again includes linguistic fractional 
ization as a control variable. With a disaggre 
gated measure of ethnic conflict as the 
dependent variable, we find that linguistic diver 
sity is significant only in predicting secession 
ist rebellions (and only in models that include 
ongoing war years). We therefore suggest that 
linguistic fractionalization captures?in an indi 
rect and rough way?an aspect of state coher 
ence. It expresses the extent to which the central 
state has linguistically assimilated its population 
in past centuries; this provides an indicator of 
a state's capacity to extend its reach over a ter 
ritory across a prolonged timeframe. Linguistic 
fractionalization should thus be linked with the 
consequences of low state cohesion, such as 
higher risk of secessionist conflict. Table 4 
shows that once ethnic politics is measured in 
more adequate and direct ways, and we have 
reached the appropriate level of disaggregation, 
the effects of linguistic fractionalization are 
indeed very limited. 
Among other control variables, anocracy and 
regime change again have no significant effects 
on any of the four types of conflict, while moun 
tainous terrain is associated with infighting but 
not rebellion. Oil resources increase the likeli 
hood of nonsecessionist wars fought by exclud 
ed groups. This is consistent with Buhaug's 
hypothesis that oil resources provide incentives 
to capture the state but not to secede from it. 
Overall, the results of these tables demon 
strate that a configurational approach to the 
study of civil wars yields important insights 
about the different mechanisms that generate 
violence and war. Measures of ethnic politics 
have heterogeneous effects on different types of 
ethnic conflict, as do other key variables such 
as population size and oil. Our configurational 
approach allows us to better understand why eth 
nic conflicts and wars might erupt in such dif 
ferent ethnopolitical constellations as seen in 
Bosnia, Northern Ireland, and Mexico. 
Bosnian Serbs were part of a segmented power 
sharing arrangement within which elite compe 
tition for control over the newly founded state 
quickly escalated to incompatible positions and 
demands. The weak coherence of the former 
Yugoslav state, and the high degree of disiden 
tification among all but the Bosniak segments of 
the population, further increased the likelihood 
of conflict and gave it a secessionist form. In 
Northern Ireland, however, the conflict erupted 
as a struggle over the political exclusion of the 
large Catholic population. Ireland was long ruled 
as an internal colony of Great Britain; the 
Northern parts of the island disidentified with the 
British state, increasing the likelihood that rebels 
would pursue secessionist aims. In 1994 in 
Mexico, commandante Marcos led a group of for 
mer peasant activists in a rebellion against the 
exclusion that the indigenous populations of 
Chiapas had suffered for centuries. In contrast to 
Northern Ireland and Bosnia, the Mexican state 
had time over the past two centuries to project its 
symbolic and political power over the population, 
who thus learned to see their membership in the 
state as self-evident and legitimate. The rebellion 
did not develop into a separatist endeavor, even 
though ample opportunities existed to unite with 
neighboring Guatemaltecan Mayas and their 
rebel organizations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article identifies the conditions under 
which struggles over state power may lead to 
ethnic conflict. The likelihood of armed con 
frontation increases as the center of power 
becomes more ethnically segmented and as 
greater proportions of a state's population are 
excluded from power because of their ethnic 
background. These conflicts are even more 
likely, and more likely to take secessionist form, 
in incoherent states where the population is 
not accustomed to direct rule by the political 
center. 
These results represent a major challenge to 
the greed-and-opportunity school, which dis 
counts ethnicity as a relevant factor in explain 
ing civil war. To be sure, our argument is not that 
ethnic identity or grievances, as opposed to 
interests and greed, motivate people to found 
and join armed organizations. Rather, ethnici 
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ty may channel the pursuit of power and pres 
tige along certain pathways such that the fac 
tions that struggle over state control will align 
along ethnic cleavages. Ethnicity is not an aim 
in itself, but the organizational means through 
which individuals struggle to gain access to 
state power. Our approach specifies the incen 
tive structures under which this political logic 
of ethnic solidarity comes into play, as well as 
the conditions under which it leads to armed 
conflict. 
Contrary to the assumptions of the diversity 
breeds-conflict school, we show that ethnic con 
flicts are not any more likely in diverse 
countries: ethnodemographic diversity indices 
rarely achieve significance and do so only for 
a circumscribed subset of conflicts. 
Ethnodemographic indices, and many theories 
of conflict and peace that rely on them, brack 
et the crucial fact that the state is neither a neu 
tral actor nor a passive arena within which ethnic 
actors operate. Rather, it is both the prize over 
which contending political actors struggle and 
a power instrument for those who control it. 
These insights have important repercussions 
for the study of ethnic diversity in general. 
Recently, economists and political scientists 
have discovered the unwelcome consequences 
of "ethnic diversity" for a range of outcomes, 
including economic development, public goods 
provision, and levels of social capital and gen 
eralized trust. Our study shows that ethnic diver 
sity indices lose much of their significance if we 
include variables that measure ethnic exclusion 
and competition. It is worth asking whether one 
would obtain similar results if our measure 
ments of ethnic exclusion, center segmentation, 
and state coherence were used to study eco 
nomic development, public goods provision, 
and social capital. In a new study of economic 
development, we show that this is indeed the 
case (Min, Cederman, and Wimmer 2009). This 
points to the possible conclusion that econom 
ic development, public goods provision, and 
conflict are endogenous to the ethnic power 
configurations analyzed in this article. These 
ethnopolitical configurations at the center of 
state power may shape the different trajecto 
ries of economic and political development in 
a much more profound way than hitherto 
acknowledged. 
Our study also goes beyond the minority 
mobilization model by showing that ethnic 
mobilization and conflict not only involve dis 
criminated minorities fighting for their rights. 
Ethnic conflict often concerns the entire con 
figuration of power, most importantly the ques 
tion of who has access to state power and who 
controls which share of it. Our results lend 
themselves to a broader perspective that is not 
focused exclusively on demographic minori 
ties at risk, but on the dynamics of ethnic pol 
itics at the center of the state. Contrary to the 
minority-mobilization model, challengers are 
most likely to find an armed following among 
excluded majorities, not minorities. In addi 
tion, groups in power instigate an important 
number of conflicts. The policy implications 
are obvious: when minorities rule, or many 
groups share power, granting rights to minori 
ties will not prevent violence. Rather, nothing 
less than a fundamental rearrangement of the 
ethnopolitical configurations of power will 
secure durable peace. 
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